This page is fully interactive with JavaScript. The text and links below are here so the archive stays reachable without it.
Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu disclosed last Friday his government's “roadmap in the fight against terrorism.”
It seems that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has, incredibly, adopted the mentality that prevailed in the Ankara political establishment of the 1980s and ‘90s. It is once more trying to view and present the Kurdish problem as primarily one that has to do with security and the economy, as if this approach had not already led to the deaths of 30,000 to 40,000 citizens and proved to be entirely futile.
At the root of the Kurdish problem lies the identity demands of the Kurds of Turkey, whether they are against the Kurdistan Workers' Party's (PKK) violence or not, whether their part of the country is less affluent than the rest or not. The vast majority of them demand the right to receive an education in their mother tongue, a concept of citizenship free from ethnic references and autonomy for their region. If Turkey fails to meet these demands, neither peace in the country nor socio-economic development in the region is possible, as clearly shown by the three-decade-long conflict with the PKK.
This was why the AKP government in its first two terms in power broke with the policies of previous governments controlled by the hard-line nationalist military, introduced steps towards lifting the restrictions on the expression of Kurdish identity, initiated peace talks with the PKK through its imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan, and established friendly relations with the Iraqi Kurds. All of these initiatives were steps in the right direction. It is a strategic imperative for Turkey to establish relations of mutual respect with Kurds wherever they find themselves.
The AKP leadership in its third term of power, however, abandoned its agenda towards consolidating democracy and achieving domestic peace, and embraced instead a policy to establish an autocratic, one-man rule by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Talks with the PKK also seem to have been subjected to this aim with the AKP's hope of a deal that would enlist the support of the pro-Kurdish movement for an executive presidency in return for the release of Öcalan.
When Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) Co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş declared, “We will not let you get elected executive president,” Erdoğan abandoned the peace talks with the PKK and reverted to the policies of a military solution to the Kurdish problem. When clashes between the security forces and PKK militants resumed last July they were no longer restricted to the mountains but had spread to urban settlements of the region, claiming the lives of a growing number of combatants and civilians. Whereas villages were forcibly evacuated in the 1990s, the people are fleeing the violence in the towns today.
A military solution to the Kurdish problem did not yield any results before and it is not at all likely to do so now. This is mainly for three reasons: 1) Kurdish identity has grown stronger than ever. The deadly clashes help the PKK to recruit more and more militants, and it has become questionable whether the PKK is really interested in resuming peace talks. 2) The PKK's sphere of influence has spread to include Rojava, the Syrian Kurdistan. It has never before had as many “friends” as it has today. The Democratic Union Party (PYD) of Rojava, which is affiliated with the PKK, is regarded as an ally by the Bashar al-Assad regime, Russia and Iran against both Daesh (the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) and Turkey, and by the United States against Daesh. 3) In Iraqi Kurdistan, President Massoud Barzani is calling for an independence referendum, demanding the redrawing of borders in the Middle East.
Ankara may still have a chance to revert the balance in its favor by following these three steps: Creating democratic reforms to meet the common demands of Turkey's Kurds, resuming peace talks with the PKK with the sincere aim of achieving results, and establishing friendly relations with the Kurds of Syria and Iraq. These steps can refresh the “1,000-year-old brotherhood between the Turks and the Kurds” and help avoid Kurdish aspirations turning into threats against Turkey. Otherwise Turkey risks serious threats to its territorial integrity. Only political ambition can blind one's eyes to such dangers.